Offshoring in a Ricardian World by Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








I thank seminar participants at Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Pennsylvania State University, Princeton
University, Wesleyan University, South Methodist University, Rochester University, Dartmouth University
and the Spring Meeting of the International Trade and Investment Program of the NBER for helpful
comments, as well as Kei-Mu Yi, Jim Tybout, Barry Ickes, Andrew Bernard, Doug Irwin, Matt Slaughter,
and Manolis Galenianos for useful suggestions. I am deeply grateful to Alexander Tarasov for outstanding
research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Offshoring in a Ricardian World
Andrés Rodríguez-Clare
NBER Working Paper No. 13203




Falling costs of coordination and communication have allowed firms in rich countries to fragment
their production process and offshore an increasing share of the value chain to low-wage countries.
Popular discussions about the aggregate impact of this phenomenon on rich countries have stressed
either a (positive) productivity effect associated with increased gains from trade, or a (negative) terms
of trade effect linked with the vanishing effect of distance on wages. This paper proposes a Ricardian
model where both of these effects are present and analyzes the effects of increased fragmentation and
offshoring in the short run and in the long run (when technology levels are endogenous). The short-run
analysis shows that when fragmentation is sufficiently high, further increases in fragmentation lead
to a deterioration (improvement) in the real wage in the rich (poor) country. But the long-run analysis
reveals that these effects may be reversed as countries adjust their research efforts in response to increased
offshoring. In particular, the rich country always gains from increased fragmentation in the long run,
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Technological change has led to a dramatic decline in the cost of communication and in the
cost of coordinating activities performed in di⁄erent locations. This has allowed ￿rms in rich
countries to fragment their production process and o⁄shore an increasing share of the value chain
to low-wage countries.1;2 Baldwin (2006) refers to this phenomenon as the "second unbundling."
In his words, "rapidly falling transportation costs caused the ￿rst unbundling, namely the end
of the necessity of making goods close to the point of consumption. More recently, rapidly
falling communication and coordination costs have fostered a second unbundling ￿the end
of the need to perform most manufacturing stages near each other. Even more recently, the
second unbundling has spread from factories to o¢ ces with the result being the o⁄shoring of
service-sector jobs." (p. 7).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of this phemonenon. There
has been much discussion recently about this with a speci￿c focus on the impact of o⁄shoring
on rich countries. Two popular approaches can be clearly distinguished. They both start from
the notion that the unbundling of the production process entails an expansion of the set of
tradeable goods and services, but go on to explore di⁄erent implications. The ￿rst approach
starts from the premise that trade entails gains for all parties involved, and then concludes
that fragmentation and o⁄shoring should be good for all countries. As Gregory Mankiw argued
during a press conference in 2004: "More things are tradable than were tradable in the past,
and that￿ s a good thing" (Mankiw and Swagel, 2006, p. 9). In contrast, the second approach
reasons that increased fragmentation possibilities and lower trade costs would in the limit allow
the world to reach an "integrated equilibrium" in which wages for identical workers in di⁄erent
countries would necessarily be equalized. In other words, wages would no longer be a⁄ected by
the location of workers. For example, in their recent book on o⁄shoring, Hira and Hira (2005)
argue that o⁄shoring a⁄ects American workers by undermining their "primary competitive
advantage over foreign workers: their physical presence in the US." Other noneconomists writing
about o⁄shoring have expressed similar concerns.3
1Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) proposed this way of thinking about technological change, fragmentation and
international trade. Yi (2003) develops a Ricardian model of trade to show that trade liberalization may also
lead to increased fragmentation (or what he calls vertical specialization) and trade.
2See Blinder (2006), Mankiw and Swagel (2006) Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a), for an analysis of
the U.S. data showing that o⁄shoring has grown dramatically over the last years.
3See Roberts (2004) and Friedman (2005).
1A simple "toy" model may be useful to understand these two approaches to o⁄shoring.
Consider ￿rst a two-country model with labor as the only factor of production and one ￿nal
good. For concreteness, let us think of the two countries as the United States (US) and the
rest of the world (RW), and assume that the US has higher productivity, which entails higher
wages. The existence of a single tradable good implies that there is no trade. But assume that
fragmentation becomes feasible, so that some labor services can now be unbundled from the
production of the ￿nal good. If the productivity in these labor services is the same across the
two countries then trade arises, with the US specializing in the production of the ￿nal good in
exchange for labor services imported from the RW via o⁄shoring operations. It is clear that
both countries gain from the new trade made possible by fragmentation, just as in the ￿rst of
the two approaches discussed above.
Imagine now that there are two ￿nal goods that can be traded at no cost between the
US and the RW, and further assume that the US has a higher productivity in good 1, while
productivities are the same in good 2. If the US is not too large relative to the world￿ s demand
for good 1, then it will specialize completely in that good and enjoy gains from trade that allow
it to sustain higher wages than in the RW. As fragmentation becomes possible, US ￿rms will
engage in o⁄shoring to use labor in the RW for part of their production process in good 1.
This will e⁄ectively enlarge the US supply of good 1, which will worsen its terms of trade. If
this process is su¢ ciently strong, the international relative price of good 1 will converge to the
US opportunity cost of this good, at which point the US will no longer bene￿t from trade and
its wage level will become equal to that in the RW.4 This captures the concerns of the second
approach to o⁄shoring mentioned earlier.
Each of these examples highlights an important aspect of the o⁄shoring phenomenon: frag-
mentation leads both to new trade and to an expansion in the supply of the good in which
the advanced country has a comparative advantage. From the point of view of the advanced
country, the ￿rst e⁄ect is positive while the second e⁄ect is negative. What is the net e⁄ect?
To answer this question, one needs to consider a general trade model that is able to capture the
roles played by both absolute and comparative advantage. The presence of an overall absolute
advantage in the advanced country is a key element, as this is what leads to the wage gap that
generates incentives for o⁄shoring. Comparative advantage is also clearly necessary as this is
4This e⁄ect of fragmentation and o⁄shoring on the rich country is discussed in Deardor⁄ (2001) and in
Leamer (2006).
2what gives rise to trade in the absence of fragmentation, which is required for the negative
terms of trade e⁄ect to arise. A general yet parsimonious model in which both absolute and
comparative advantage play a role in determining wages and the gains from trade is Eaton and
Kortum￿ s (2002) model of Ricardian trade. In this paper I start out with this model and then
allow for fragmentation and o⁄shoring to explore their impact on wages in both advanced and
poor countries.5
Eaton and Kortum model sector-level productivities as being drawn from a distribution that
is common across countries except for a technology parameter T. This technology parameter
determines the location of the productivity distribution: countries with a higher T have "better"
distributions in the sense of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. Apart from T, countries also
di⁄er in L, the size of their labor force (which is the only factor of production). Assuming away
trading costs for simplicity, wages are determined by the ratio of technology to size, T=L. A
high T=L means that the country would have many sectors in which it has absolute advantage
relative to its size, leading to a high equilibrium wage. It is interesting to note that, given a
￿xed technology level, an increase in a country￿ s labor force - caused perhaps by immigration -
would lead to a decline in T=L and hence a decline in the country￿ s wage. This is nothing but
the classic e⁄ect of size on a country￿ s terms of trade in a Ricardian model.6
Fragmentation is introduced into the model by assuming that production involves the com-
bination of a continuum of labor services, a share of which may be o⁄shored at no cost and
with no loss of productivity.7 Thus, fragmentation leads ￿rms in high high-wage countries (i.e.,
countries with a high T=L) to o⁄shore a part of their production process to low-wage countries.
This represents new trade, where high T=L countries export ￿nal goods in exchange for imports
of labor services through o⁄shoring.
This model provides a simple way to study the impact of fragmentation and o⁄shoring on
wages in both rich and poor countries. Both e⁄ects mentioned above are present: there are
5I focus entirely on the impact of o⁄shoring on average wages rather than on the wage distribution or skill
premia. In other words, I am interested in understanding the conditions under which the winners from o⁄shoring
can compensate the losers, but do not consider the di⁄erential impacts on workers with di⁄erent skill levels or
in di⁄erent activities or industries. Readers interested in this issue can consult Feenstra and Hanson (1996,
1999), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Deardor⁄ (2004), Markusen (2004), Blinder (2006), and Grossman and
Rossi-Heinsberg (2006a, 2006b), among others.
6See Davis and Weinstein (2002) for a recent discussion of the economic impact of immigration in the United
States using this basic idea.
7The modelling of o⁄shoring as trade in a continuum of labor services is similar to the approach in Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b), see below.
3gains from the new trade that takes place, as well as a movement towards wage equalization
that harms the rich countries and bene￿ts the poor countries. The ￿rst is a productivity e⁄ect;
it captures the idea that ￿rms experience a decline in their unit costs as they o⁄shore part
of their production to low-wage countries. The second is a terms of trade e⁄ect. Finally, this
analysis also reveals the existence of a world-e¢ ciency e⁄ect, often neglected in discussions
of o⁄shoring, which entails a decline in world prices as labor is e⁄ectively reallocated from
countries with low to countries with high T=L ratios.
From the point of view of poor countries, only the terms of trade and world e¢ ciency
e⁄ects are present, and both are positive, so these countries always bene￿t from fragmentation.
But rich countries have to deal with the negative terms of trade e⁄ect. The analysis reveals
that there is always a point beyond which increased fragmentation leads to a negative e⁄ect
on the real wage in the rich country. In other words, when fragmentation is already high, a
further increase in fragmentation generates a negative terms of trade e⁄ect that dominates the
productivity and world-e¢ ciency e⁄ects.8 More speci￿cally, if the technology gap between rich
and poor countries is not too low, then the real wage in rich countries as a function of the level
of fragmentation is shaped like an inverted U: initially fragmentation leads to a higher real
wage, but this is eventually reversed as fragmentation becomes su¢ ciently high. In the limit,
as we approach a world with complete fragmentation and wage equalization, the real wage in
the rich country must necessarily be lower than it would be under no fragmentation.
The result that in rich countries the positive productivity e⁄ect of o⁄shoring can be dom-
inated by a negative terms of trade e⁄ect is reminiscent of the possibility of "immiserizing
growth" for large countries analyzed by Bhagwati (1958). This suggests that in the presence of
an optimal tari⁄ or export tax, increased fragmentation would always increase welfare for the
rich country. I show that this is indeed the case (at least for a "small economy" for which this
can be shown analytically).
The discussion of fragmentation and wages so far takes technology levels as exogenous,
and hence can be interpreted as a short-run analysis. But in the long run technology levels are
endogenous, determined by research e⁄orts and research productivity. It is conceivable that the
resources released by o⁄shoring in the rich countries lead to an increased allocation of resources
to research. This would tend to increase the T=L ratio and hence provides a new positive e⁄ect
8Although clearly related, this is not a simple application of the immiserizing growth possibility studied by
Bhagwati (1958). In fact, as discussed below in footnote 12, although higher e¢ ciency in the Eaton and Kortum
model leads to declining terms of trade, this would never dominate the direct bene￿ts.
4on wages not present in the static analysis.
To explore this possibility, I consider a dynamic model where technology levels are endoge-
nous, as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). In this dynamic model workers choose to work in the
production sector or to do research, which leads to new ideas or technologies. When the technol-
ogy discovered is superior to the state of the art, its owner (or patent holder) earns quasi-rents
that provide a return on the opportunity cost of research. The technology parameter T can now
be interpreted as the "stock of ideas" in a country, and richer countries are the ones that have
a higher stock of ideas per worker. Without fragmentation, the fraction of workers devoted
to research turns out to be the same across countries, but countries with a higher research
productivity (i.e., a higher rate of arrival of ideas per researcher) can sustain a higher T=L
and hence higher wages in steady state. Fragmentation generates the same short-run e⁄ects
as above, but now we must also take into account the impact on the allocation of workers
between production and research in both the rich and poor countries. It will be shown that
fragmentation and o⁄shoring induce more people in rich countries to work as researchers, which
in the long run increases T=L and wages, counteracting the negative e⁄ects mentioned above.
In fact, the analysis reveals that in steady state this research e⁄ect weakens the terms of trade
e⁄ect to such an extent that it is now always dominated by the productivity e⁄ect. The result
is that in the long run wages in rich countries always increase with fragmentation.
The long-run e⁄ects of fragmentation turn out to be quite di⁄erent in poor countries. There,
as people start to work as providers of labor services through o⁄shoring operations, the fraction
of people devoted to research falls, decreasing T=L and wages. This entails a negative research
e⁄ect that in steady state exactly compensates the positive terms of trade e⁄ect. Thus, just
like every other country (even the ones that do not participate in o⁄shoring activities), poor
countries bene￿t from fragmentation only through the world-e¢ ciency e⁄ect.
In sum, the analysis suggests that increased fragmentation could indeed have negative e⁄ects
for rich countries, but that these e⁄ects dissipate in time, so that the long run e⁄ects are always
positive for the countries doing the o⁄shoring. In contrast, the long run e⁄ects of fragmentation
in poor countries are weaker than the corresponding short run e⁄ects. For the rich country, the
presence of opposite short and long run e⁄ects implies that increased fragmentation could be
harmful or bene￿cial. For a special case that can be analytically solved, I show that as long as
the speed with which resources can be reallocated across production and research is su¢ ciently
high then the long run e⁄ects dominate and the rich country gains from o⁄shoring.
5There is a long list of recent papers that have analyzed the possible e⁄ects of fragmentation
and o⁄shoring on wages in rich countries.9 Samuelson (2004) stressed the possible negative
impact of o⁄shoring if it leads to spillovers that erode the rich countries￿technological advantage
in exporting sectors, while Deardor⁄(2001, 2005) showed that, even without such spillovers, rich
countries would su⁄er a deterioration of their terms of trade that could more than compensate
any associated gains. Bhagwati et. al. (2004) and Mankiw and Swagel (2006) argued that the
terms of trade e⁄ect would likely be dominated by the positive productivity e⁄ect. The present
paper shows that in the short run this is not necessarily the case; in fact, when fragmentation
is su¢ ciently high, further increases in fragmentation (and o⁄shoring) necessarily hurt the rich
country. But, again, this applies only in the short run; in the long run, when research e⁄orts
have had a time to fully adjust to the new environment, then rich countries are always better
o⁄ with o⁄shoring than without.
Another group of papers have explored the implications of fragmentation on wages for skilled
and unskilled workers in the context of a Hecksher-Ohlin model of trade.10 Prominent examples
are Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Deardor⁄(2004), Kohler (2004),
Markusen (2005), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a, 2006b) and Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2007). The contribution of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006b) is particularly
relevant to the present paper. In their main speci￿cation, fragmentation is seen as the decline
in the cost of trading a continuum of unskilled tasks. Focusing on a skilled-labor abundant
country, they show that fragmentation leads to increased o⁄shoring of such tasks, a positive
productivity e⁄ect that increases the wage of unskilled workers, and an improvement in the
terms of trade that has the usual Stolper-Samuelson implications. In another speci￿cation they
explore the consequences of an overall decline in the costs of o⁄shoring all tasks (skilled and
unskilled). They note that this generates a positive productivity e⁄ect, but a deterioration of
the country￿ s terms of trade. O⁄shoring also has these con￿ icting e⁄ects on the rich country in
the Ricardian model presented below, but the model has the advantage that these two e⁄ects
can be compared in such a way that the net result can be fully characterized both in the short
run and in the long run.
9For recent surveys see Mankiw and Swagel (2006) and Baldwin (2006). See also Baily and Lawrence (2004)
for an exploration of the implications of o⁄shoring for the loss of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. over the last
decades. For an analysis of the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on unemployment see Mitra and Ranjan (2007).
10Another approach is Kohler (2004), who explores the consequences of o⁄shoring in a speci￿c-factors model
of a small-open economy and shows conditions under which the presence of non-convexities may lead o⁄shoring
to harm the rich country.
6The connection between o⁄shoring and innovation has received scant attention in the liter-
ature. One exception is Glass and Saggi (2001), who extend Grossman and Helpman￿ s (1991)
quality-ladder growth model to a two-country setting with o⁄shoring. Focusing on the steady
state, they show that a decline in the cost of o⁄shoring leads to an increase in innovation in
the rich country and an increase in the growth rate. However, in their model, the increase in
innovation must be accompanied by a decline in the rich country￿ s wage to keep innovation
pro￿table. In contrast, I build on the quasi-endogenous growth framework of Kortum (1997)
and Eaton and Kortum (2001), so o⁄shoring has no growth e⁄ects and the steady state e⁄ect
on the rich country￿ s wage is positive thanks to the direct productivity e⁄ect and the long run
e⁄ect of increased research on the rich country￿ s technology distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the static model and
derives the implications of fragmentation on both rich and poor countries participating in
o⁄shoring activities. In two extensions I consider the optimal trade policy for the rich country
and an alternative way to think of fragmentation as a decline in the cost of o⁄shoring. Section
3 presents a dynamic model where technology levels are endogenously determined by research
e⁄orts in each country. In the short-run this model is equivalent to the static model of Section
2. I use this model to explore the implications of fragmentation on long run (steady state)
research intensities and wages in the rich and poor countries participating in o⁄shoring. I also
study the transition dynamics to understand the net welfare e⁄ects of an unexpected increase in
fragmentation. Section 4 compares the implications of o⁄shoring to immigration, and Section
5 presents some extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The static model
The static model builds on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of Ricardian trade under
the simplifying assumption of no transportation costs. There are N countries, indexed by
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, and a continuum of tradable ￿nal goods, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Labor is the
only factor of production, and is supplied inelastically with measure Li in country i. Preferences
across goods are Cobb-Douglas and symmetric, so that an equal share of income is spent on
each good j.
All ￿nal goods are produced from a single "common input" whose cost in country i is
7denoted by ci. In a standard Ricardian model the common input is labor, so ci is simply the
wage wi. Here I allow for a more general production structure to introduce fragmentation and
o⁄shoring into the model, so ci may di⁄er from wi. In particular, I assume that the common
input is produced through a Leontief production function from a continuum of "intermediate
services" indexed by k 2 [0;1]. Formally, letting x(k) represent the quantity of intermediate
service k, then output of the common input is X = minkfx(k)g. In turn, x(k) is produced
one-to-one from labor. If all intermediate services must be produced directly by the ￿rm, then
this collapses to the standard case with ci = wi. Fragmentation is introduced by allowing ￿rms
to costlessly o⁄shore at most a certain exogenous share ￿ 2 [0;1[ of the intermediate services.
The assumption that ￿ is exogenous simpli￿es the analysis considerably but is not essential: as
I show in Section 5, the main results go through in a setting where the measure of services that
are o⁄shored is endogenous to the costs of trading services as in Kohler (2004) and Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). Below I refer to the restriction that ￿rms cannot o⁄shore more
than a share ￿ of services as the "o⁄shoring restriction."
To simplify the analysis and exposition, I focus on the possibility of o⁄shoring by country 1
from country 2 (country 1 is the rich country), while o⁄shoring is not possible for all the other
countries. In Section 5 I extend the analysis to allow for o⁄shoring between three countries.
If w1 > w2 then ￿rms in country 1 would want to exploit all opportunities for o⁄shoring, and
hence the unit cost of the common input there would be
c1 = (1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2 (1)
More generally, we have c1 = minfw1;(1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2g while ci = wi for i 6= 1.
The common input is converted into ￿nal goods through the use of linear technologies that
vary in productivity across goods and countries. Letting zi(j) denote the productivity for good j
in country i then country i0s unit cost for j is ci=zi(j). These linear technologies are available to
all ￿rms within a country, so the appropriate market structure is perfect competition. Given the
absence of transportation costs, then the price of good j in all countries is simply mini fci=zi(j)g.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the productivities zi(j) are modelled as the realization of
a random variable that is assumed to be independent across goods and countries. In particular,
in country i the productivity zi for each good j 2 [0;1] is drawn from the FrŁchet distribution,
Fi(z) = Pr[zi ￿ z] = exp[￿Tiz
￿￿] (2)
8where Ti > 0 and ￿ > 1. The parameter Ti can vary across countries and determines the
location of the distribution: a higher Ti implies that the productivity draws are likely to be
better. Thus, Ti is country i0s technology level and determines the share of goods in which it has
absolute advantage relative to other countries across the continuum of goods. The parameter
￿ (which is common across countries) determines the variability of the draws and hence the
strength of comparative advantage: a lower ￿ implies a stronger comparative advantage.
2.1 Equilibrium with no o⁄shoring
To establish a benchmark, introduce some notation and develop some initial intuition for the
results to come, consider ￿rst the case with no o⁄shoring, or ￿ = 0. The unit cost of the
common input in country i is then simply wi (i.e., ci = wi for all i).
Given the preferences speci￿ed above, the share of total income that each country spends
on imports from country i is equal to the share of goods for which country i is the least-cost
producer. In turn, this is equal to ￿i = Tiw
￿￿




k .11 Note that, given wi,
a higher Ti implies more exports, and the same happens with a lower wi given Ti.
Wages are determined by the trade-balance conditions, which in this context of no trade
costs are simply given by
￿iY = wiLi (3)
where Y ￿
P
k wkLk is worldwide income. Using country N0s labor as numeraire (i.e., wN = 1)
it is easy to show that
wi = ￿ (Ti=Li)
b (4)
where ￿ ￿ (TN=LN)
￿b and b ￿ 1=(1+￿). Note that an increase in size Li holding the technology
level Ti constant implies a decline in country i0s wage. This happens through a deterioration
of country i0s terms of trade and is the channel through which increased fragmentation and
o⁄shoring could lower country 10s income level.12
11To see this, note that the distribution of the price that country i would charge for a particular good,
pi = wi=z, is Pri(pi ￿ p) = Pri(z ￿ wi=p) = Gi(p) ￿ 1 ￿ e￿Ti(wi=p)
￿￿
. In turn, the distribution of the
minimum price across countries i 2 ￿, p(￿) ￿ mini2￿fpig, is G￿(p) = 1 ￿
Y
i2￿







i . Hence, letting ￿(￿i) be the set of countries other than i, the probability that country i
has the lowest cost is ￿i =
R 1
0 G￿(￿i)(p)dGi(p) = Tiw
￿￿
i =￿.
12Note, however, that growth cannot be immiserizing in this case. Consider an increase in productivity that
is manifested as an increase in "e¢ ciency units" per person (an increase in T would always lead to a higher
wage). Total e¢ ciency units are now L = e ￿ N, with e being e¢ ciency units per person and N being the level
92.2 Equilibrium with o⁄shoring
Consider now the case in which o⁄shoring is feasible (￿ > 0). The cost of the common input in
country 1 will di⁄er from the wage there because of the possibility of indirectly using labor at
the cheaper cost w2 in country 2. In particular, if w1 > w2, then the o⁄shoring restriction will
be binding, and c1 will be given by (1). Moreover, since a share 1 ￿ ￿ of the total quantity of
the common input is produced domestically, then the full employment condition in country 1
entails (1￿￿)X = L1. The total amount of labor used in country 2 via o⁄shoring, ￿X, is then
equal to ￿L1, where ￿ ￿ ￿=(1￿￿). Since all countries other than 1 do not engage in o⁄shoring




for all i. The trade balance conditions are unchanged for i 6= 1;2, whereas for countries 1 and
2 they are now given by
￿1Y = w1L1 + ￿w2L1 (6)
and
￿2Y = w2L2 ￿ ￿w2L1 (7)
The term ￿w2L1 is simply the value of intermediate services imported by country 1 from country
2.







e L2 ￿ L2 ￿ ￿L1 (9)
is the number of workers left in country 2 for production given that ￿L1 workers are devoted
to o⁄shoring services for country 1. Comparing (4) and (8) shows that country 20s wage is
increased by o⁄shoring, i.e. w0
2(￿) > 0. The reason for this is that a decline in the number of
workers left for production given a ￿xed technology level increases the ratio T2=e L2 and thereby
improves country 20s terms of trade. As intuition would suggest, the e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on w2
is exactly the same as the e⁄ect of a reduction in L2 due to outmigration in country 2.
of population (or labor force). The wage is now ￿e(T=eN)b which is increasing in e given that b < 1.
10Turning to country 1, combining equations (5) for i = 1 with (6) implies that






e L1 ￿ (1 + ￿)L1 (11)
is the "e⁄ective" amount of labor devoted to production in country 1 once we take into account
the extra labor used through o⁄shoring. Equation (10) shows that, given w2, o⁄shoring has
two opposite e⁄ects on the wage in country 1: ￿rst, there is an increase in the e⁄ective number
of workers in production (i.e., e L1 > L1), which worsens its terms of trade; and second, there
is a decline in costs thanks to the use of cheaper labor in country 2 through o⁄shoring (i.e.,
w2 < w1). The net impact of these two e⁄ects on the equilibrium wage in country 1 is explored
below. For now, the task is to fully characterize the equilibrium for all the relevant parameter
values.
Equations (8) and (10) determine the equilibrium wages in countries 1 and 2 if two con-
straints are satis￿ed. First, there is a resource constraint in country 2, which implies that
￿L1 ￿ L2. Second, wages satisfy w1 > w2. This is equivalent to T1=e L1 > T2=e L2. Letting
￿ ￿
T1=L1
T2=L2, then this inequality can be written as
￿ (1 ￿ ￿L1=L2) > 1 + ￿ (12)
From now on I will assume that ￿ > 1. This is simply a condition that with no o⁄shoring we
have w1 > w2. Given ￿ > 1 then the inequality in (12) is satis￿ed for ￿ = 0. As ￿ increases the





Thus, the inequality in (12) is satis￿ed if and only if ￿ < ￿ ￿. If this inequality is satis￿ed, then
it is easy to check that the resource constraint in country 2 (i.e., ￿L1 ￿ L2) is also satis￿ed.
Thus, if ￿ < ￿ ￿ then the equilibrium is characterized by the solution of equations (8) and (10).
What is the equilibrium if ￿ ￿ ￿? In this case the equilibrium entails w1 = w2, the
o⁄shoring restriction is not binding, and the equilibrium is characterized by the equations (8)
and (10) but with ￿ rather than ￿. It is important to note that if ￿ ￿ ￿ then o⁄shoring allows
economies 1 and 2 to reach an integrated equilibrium, so factor price equalization (FPE) holds
(i.e., w1 = w2). In the rest of the paper I refer to this case as "full o⁄shoring."
112.3 Wages under Full O⁄shoring
In this subsection I compare the wage in country 1 under full o⁄shoring with the level that
prevails with no o⁄shoring. In the next subsections I turn to a more general comparative-statics
analysis to understand the e⁄ect of fragmentation on wages in countries 1 and 2.
Since economies 1 and 2 are e⁄ectively integrated through o⁄shoring, it is possible to consider
them as if they were a single region in a world with no o⁄shoring. To explore this further, I
now use the index m to refer to the region composed of countries 1 and 2. Letting Tm ￿ T1+T2





where ￿ = Tmw￿￿




k . Letting Lm ￿ L1+L2 then total income in
region m is wmLm and the trade balance condition for this region is now simply ￿mY = wmLm.
Just as in the case of no o⁄shoring considered above we now have
wm = ￿ (Tm=Lm)
b
The e⁄ect of full o⁄shoring on the wage in country 1 can now be determined by comparing
w1 under no o⁄shoring with wm. It is easy to see that since ￿ > 1 then Tm=Lm < T1=L1
and hence wm < w1 j￿=0. Intuitively, integration with country 2 through o⁄shoring e⁄ectively
lowers country 10s technology level per worker (T=L) and this leads to a decline in its terms of
trade.
This result concerns the e⁄ect of full o⁄shoring on the wage in country 1 relative to the
wage of the numeraire country. But it is also important to consider the impact on the real wage
w1=P, where P is the price index of a unit of utility. It is straightforward to show that
P = e ￿￿
￿1=￿ (13)




k , this expression implies
that higher technology levels or lower unit costs lead to lower prices. From this expression it is
13To see this, note from footnote 11 that the distribution of the international price is G￿(p) with ￿ being the
set of all countries, or G(p) = 1 ￿ e￿￿p
￿
. Therefore, P = exp
R 1
0 ln(p)dG(p) = e￿￿=￿￿￿1=￿, where ￿ is Euler￿ s
constant (i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿
R 1
0 ln(x)e￿xdx). Readers familiar with Eaton and Kortum (2001) will note that this is
slightly di⁄erent from their result, namely P = ￿￿￿1=￿. This di⁄erence is due to an inconsequential mistake in
Eaton and Kortum (2001).
12now easy to establish that P is lower under full o⁄shoring than with no o⁄shoring,14 a result
that re￿ ects the higher e¢ ciency attained when labor e⁄ectively reallocates from country 2
to country 1. There are then two opposite e⁄ects on the real wage in country 1 as we move
from no o⁄shoring to full o⁄shoring: the terms of trade e⁄ect, which decreases the relative
wage w1, and the world-e¢ ciency e⁄ect, which lowers the price index P. Note that there is no
productivity e⁄ect here because there is no longer a wage gap between countries 1 and 2; as a
consequence, country 1 does not gain from trading services with country 2. It is shown in the
Appendix that the terms of trade e⁄ect always dominates the world-e¢ ciency e⁄ect, so that
w1=P is necessarily lower under full o⁄shoring than with no o⁄shoring. Recalling that the wage
in country 2 increases with o⁄shoring, this result leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There is full o⁄shoring if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Under full o⁄shoring w1 and w1=P are lower
and w2 and w2=P are higher than with no o⁄shoring.
2.4 The e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on relative wages
Above it was already shown that the wage in country 2 increases with o⁄shoring. I now explore
how o⁄shoring a⁄ects w1. Solving for w1 from (10) yields
w1 = (1 + ￿)e w1 ￿ ￿w2




is the wage that would prevail in country 1 with no o⁄shoring if its
labor supply was e L1. In other words, this would be the equilibrium wage if o⁄shoring only
generated a terms of trade e⁄ect but no productivity e⁄ect. Note that both e w1 and w2 are
a⁄ected by ￿. Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ and simplifying yields
w
0




2 + (w1 ￿ w2)=(1 + ￿) (14)
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (14) captures the terms of trade e⁄ect. It is negative because
e w0
1 = ￿be w1=(1+￿) < 0. Intuitively, as ￿ increases the "e⁄ective" supply e L1 increases and this
leads to a decline in the wage through a worsening of country 10s terms of trade. The second
term is negative because, as shown above, w2 is increasing in ￿. This is simply a demand e⁄ect:
as o⁄shoring increases, this pushes up country 20s wages and this hurts country 1, which uses
14This just requires showing that Tmw￿￿




2 for the wages w1 and w2 that prevail
with no o⁄shoring. But using wi = ￿ (Ti=Li)
b for i = 1;2;m, then this follows from the concavity of the function
f(x) = xb￿.
13country 20s labor as an input. This second term could also be seen as part of a broader terms
of trade e⁄ect that takes into account the price that country 1 must pay for imported services.
Finally, the third term on the RHS of (14) is the productivity e⁄ect, which is positive as long
as w1 > w2. This e⁄ect captures the idea that by having access to cheaper labor in country 2,
country 1 achieves a decline in its costs, and this leads to higher wages there.
To characterize the net marginal e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on wages in country 1, i.e. w0
1(￿), it is
useful to note the following two points: ￿rst, the productivity e⁄ect depends positively on the
wage di⁄erence w1 ￿ w2 which in turn is increasing in the ratio of per capita technology levels
in country 1 relative to country 2, or ￿.15 Thus, w0
1(￿) is more likely to be positive if ￿ is large.
In particular, evaluating w0









1(0) ? 0 according to whether ￿ ? (1 ￿ b)￿1=b. Second, as ￿ gets close to ￿ ￿ the wage
di⁄erence w1 ￿ w2 goes to zero and the productivity e⁄ect vanishes, so w0
1(￿) is necessarily
negative for ￿ close enough to ￿ ￿. These two points combined suggest that for ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ b)￿1=b
the curve w1(￿) is always decreasing, whereas for ￿ > (1 ￿ b)￿1=b this curve is shaped like an
inverted U. The next Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 If ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ b)￿1=b then w1(￿) is decreasing in ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[, whereas if ￿ >
(1 ￿ b)￿1=b then w1(￿) is shaped like an inverted U on ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[.
2.5 The e⁄ect of o⁄shoring on real wages
To explore the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring on real wages, we need to bring the world-e¢ ciency e⁄ect
into the analysis. As one would expect, o⁄shoring decreases the price index P. Intuitively,
an increase in ￿ e⁄ectively implies more possibilities to trade, and this increases worldwide
e¢ ciency. The following proposition formalizes this result:
Proposition 3 The price index P is decreasing in ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[.
Since w2(￿) is increasing then clearly w2(￿)=P(￿) will also be increasing. Similarly, if
w1(￿) is increasing then w1(￿)=P(￿) will be increasing as well. But what happens when w1(￿)
15The result that the gains from o⁄shoring are more likely to be positive when the wage gap is higher is also
present in Kohler (2004).
14is decreasing? The following Proposition shows that the characterization of w1(￿)=P (￿) is very
similar to the characterization of w1(￿) in Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 There exists ^ ￿ such that if ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ then w1=P is decreasing in ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[, while
if ￿ > ^ ￿ then w1=P is shaped like an inverted U in ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[.
This proposition shows that when fragmentation is su¢ ciently high, then further increases
in fragmentation (and o⁄shoring) necessarily hurt the rich country. This arises because the
(positive) productivity and world-e¢ ciency e⁄ects are dominated by the (negative) terms of
trade and demand e⁄ects.
2.6 Export Taxes
As discussed above, the negative impact of o⁄shoring on the rich country takes place through
a deterioration of its terms of trade. A natural question is whether an appropriate tari⁄ or
export tax could prevent such a negative impact. This section explores this idea, focusing on
the case of an export tax; the impact of a tari⁄ would be equivalent. To derive analytical
results, I will consider the region composed of countries 1 and 2 as a "small economy," in the
Alvarez and Lucas (2005) sense of the limit of a sequence in which the ratios ki = Ti=Li for
i = 1;2 and L2=L1 remain constant but L1 ! 0. The results reveal that, under an appropriate
export tax, an increase in fragmentation never makes the economy worse o⁄. This is analogous
to the well-known proposition that an optimal tari⁄ or export tax rules out the possibility of
immiserizing growth for a large economy (Bhagwati, 1958).
Consider an export tax in country 1 of ￿￿1, so that if a ￿rm exports value v, the government
collects (￿ ￿ 1)v. The price of a good with productivity z that is exported by country 1 would
be ￿c1=z: the ￿rm only gets c1=z, while the government collects the rest, (￿ ￿1)c1=z. I assume
that the revenue collected from this tax, R, is distributed back to consumers in lump-sum
fashion. Thus, income in country 1 is now Y1 = w1L1 + R.
Let ￿
f
1 be the share of spending by foreigners (i.e., consumers in countries other than country









i6=1 Tiw￿￿. On the other hand, the share of spending by foreigners on goods








The corresponding spending shares for consumers in country 1, which are denoted by ￿i, are the
same as in the previous sections. The trade balance conditions for countries i 6= 1;2 are then
￿iY1+￿
f
i Y￿1 = wiLi, where Y￿1 =
P
i6=1 Liwi is the income level in the rest of the world. Given
the expressions for ￿i and ￿
f
i , it is easy to show that for i 6= 1;2 wages are wi = ￿ (Ti=Li)
b, just






, as in equations (8) and (9).
Next consider the equilibrium in country 1. Foreigners spend ￿
f
1Y￿1 on goods from country
1, ￿rms there earn ￿
f
1Y￿1=￿ as revenue on those exports, and the government collects ￿ ￿ 1







and the trade balance condition for country 1 is now
￿
f
1Y￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)Y1 + ￿w2L1 (18)
The LHS of (18) is total export revenue, while the RHS is total spending on imports, including






1 (w2(￿)L2 + Y￿2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)
￿
w1L1 + (1 ￿ 1=￿)￿
f
1 (w2(￿)L2 + Y￿2)
￿
+ ￿w2(￿)L1 (19)
Given ￿, the solution to this equation yields the equilibrium wage in country 1 as long as
w1 ￿ w2. Otherwise, the equilibrium entails "full o⁄shoring," with the extent of o⁄shoring
given by ￿ ￿(￿) de￿ned implicitly by the previous equation with w1 = w2(￿).
Equation (19) has an analytic solution in w1 only for the case in which the region composed
of countries 1 and 2 is a "small economy," i.e. in the limit as L1 ! 0 (with ki for i = 1;2 and
L2=L1 constant along the sequence). The results derived above for countries i 6= 1;2 imply that
￿￿2 ￿
P
i6=1;2 Tiw￿￿ and Y￿2 do not depend on the export tax, and do not change as countries
1 and 2 are getting small along the sequence that we consider below (with L1 ! 0). Moreover,





, then w2 is also constant along the sequence and so is Y￿1. Thus,
taking the limit as L1 ! 0 in (19), using hats over variables to denote the limits, and recalling
16that c1 = (1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2, then






whereas b w1(￿;￿) = (1+￿)b c1(￿;￿)￿￿w2(￿).16 This implies that as long as the export tax does
not a⁄ect the extent of o⁄shoring (see below), then the only e⁄ect of this policy is to decrease
c1 in such a way that c1￿ remains constant. This happens through a decline in the wage that
exactly o⁄sets the increase in the export cost caused by the tax, leaving total export revenues
constant.
If the tax is high enough, however, then the extent of o⁄shoring will be a⁄ected. To see
this, note that for high enough ￿ the wage b w1(￿;￿) would become lower than w2(￿), and the
equilibrium would then be characterized by full o⁄shoring, with the extent of o⁄shoring ￿ ￿(￿)





It is clear that ￿ ￿(￿) is decreasing in ￿.17 Moreover, if ￿ is so high that ￿ > ￿b then o⁄shoring
would vanish. Thus, if ￿ and ￿ are such that b c1(￿;￿) ￿ w2(￿), the equilibrium entails o⁄shoring
up to the o⁄shoring restriction given by ￿; otherwise, the equilibrium depends on whether
￿ ￿(￿) ? 0: if ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ 0 then the extent of o⁄shoring is ￿ ￿(￿) and wages are equalized in countries
1 and 2, whereas if ￿ ￿(￿) < 0 then there is no o⁄shoring and the wage in country 1 is lower
than in country 2 (i.e., b w1(0;￿) < w2(0)).18 These results are stated formally in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 Let ￿o(￿;￿) ￿ maxfminf￿; ￿ ￿(￿)g;0g. Relative to the wage in country N, the
equilibrium wages in countries i 6= 1;2 are wi = ￿ (Ti=Li)
b, whereas (in the limit as L1 ! 0)
wages in countries 1 and 2 are given by b w1(￿o(￿;￿);￿) and w2(￿o(￿;￿)).
The total e⁄ect of the export tax on country 1 depends on the impact of ￿ on b Y1(￿;￿). But
it turns out that limY1(￿;￿)=L1 = b w1(￿;1) = w1 (￿).19 This implies that, given ￿, the decline
16To derive this result, ￿rst divide boths sides of equation (19) by ￿
f
1, and then take the limit of both sides.
Simplifying the resulting expression and then noting from wi = ￿ (Ti=Li)
b for i 6= 1;2 that Y￿2=￿￿2 = ￿
1=b
yields (20).
17Also note that ￿ ￿(1) = ￿ ￿ =
￿￿1
1+￿L1=L2, as de￿ned in subsection 2.3.
18I am implicitly assuming here that it is not possible for country 2 to import services from country 1 through
o⁄shoring. The extension to consider this possibility is straightforward.
19To see this, simply note that limY1(￿;￿)=L1 = b w1(￿;￿) + limR=L1. Taking the limit on the RHS and
simplifying yields the result.
17in the wage generated by the export tax is exactly matched by the revenue collected by the
export tax. The e⁄ect of the tax on total income in country 1 is then easy to characterize. Let
￿M be the level of ￿ at which w1 (￿) is maximized.20 If ￿ ￿ ￿M then the optimal export tax
is zero, whereas if ￿M < ￿ the optimal export tax is given implicitly by ￿ ￿(￿￿) = ￿M. Imagine
that the tax is set at its optimal level given ￿. Then it is clear that total income in country 1
is always weakly increasing in ￿. The following proposition states this formally:
Proposition 5 Let ￿M be the level of ￿ at which w1(￿) is maximized and let ￿￿ be de￿ned
implicitly by ￿ ￿(￿￿) = ￿M. For a small economy, the optimal export tax is zero if ￿ ￿ ￿M
and given by ￿￿ for ￿ > ￿M. Under the optimal export tax policy, the extent of o⁄shoring
increases with ￿ until ￿M and remains constant thereafter, and total income in country 1 is
weakly increasing in ￿.
3 The Full Dynamic Model
The previous section analyzed the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring in a static model where technology
levels are ￿xed. This section explores how these results are a⁄ected when technology levels are
endogenous in a full dynamic model. The "short run" of this dynamic model will be equivalent
to the static model analyzed above.
Technological progress is modeled as in Eaton and Kortum (2001). Workers choose to do
research or work in the productive sector. Recall that in the previous section we used Li to
denote the number of workers engaged in production (including producing intermediate services
as part of o⁄shoring operations for other countries). Letting LF
it be the total labor force and Rit
be the number of people working as researchers in country i at time t, then the full employment
condition is Rit+Lit = LF
it. I assume that LF
it grows at a constant rate gL that is common across
countries. Also, I assume that the reallocation of workers between production and research is
sluggish. This implies that Lit will be a state variable, and hence ￿xed in the short run (as in
the previous section and subsection 3.1 below). To simplify the analysis, I assume that people
are born as producers or researchers in proportion to the current population, and then at each
point in time people get a chance to switch sectors at a constant and exogenous probability ￿P
(￿R) for those in production (research). For future purposes, note that in steady state people
20Just as in the previous subsection, the curve b w1(￿;1) is either downward sloping or behaves like an inverted
U, so ￿M is well de￿ned.
18will be happy to stay where they are born, so ￿P and ￿R will not be relevant for the steady
state analysis in subsection 3.2. The size of ￿P and ￿R will a⁄ect the transition path after the
economy is hit by a shock that changes the steady state allocation of people between research
and production, as I consider in subsection 3.3.
A researcher in country i draws technologies or "ideas" at a Poisson rate ￿i. This parameter
re￿ ects research productivity and may vary across countries. Letting Tit be the total number





Each idea has two characteristics: ￿rst, the good j 2 [0;1] to which it applies, and, second,
its productivity q. Each of these characteristics is modeled as the realization of a random
variable: j is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;1], while q is distributed Pareto with
parameter ￿ > 1. Formally, for q ￿ 1 it is assumed that
H(q) = Pr[q
0 ￿ q] = 1 ￿ q
￿￿
It can be shown that the distribution of zit(j) (which will be independent across goods and
countries) has the FrŁchet form, as in (2), with Tit given by (22).21 In other words, the process
for the arrival of ideas speci￿ed here leads to the FrŁchet productivity frontier postulated in
the static model, with the parameter ￿ in the FrŁchet distribution coming from the parameter
￿ in the Pareto distribution of the quality of ideas, and the parameter Ti growing over time and
being equal to the stock of ideas in country i at time t.
Researchers sell their ideas to ￿rms that engage in Bertrand competition with other ￿rms
in the worldwide market for consumer goods. Consider the competition for a particular good.
Only the ￿rms holding the best idea for this good within some country have a chance of surviving
the competition in the international market. Letting zit(j) be the maximum q over ideas that
apply to good j in country i at time t, then the country that captures the worldwide market
for good j at time t is given by argmini fci=zit(j)g.
21To derive this result, note that the number of ideas k that have arrived for any good at time t is distributed
Poisson with parameter Tit, so Pr(k0 = k) = e￿TitTk
it=k!. Hence, Pr(z0










k=0 xk=k! = ex implies Pr(z0
it ￿ z) = Fit(z) = exp[￿Titz￿￿] for z ￿ 1. Note that since H(q) is de￿ned
for q ￿ 1 then this distribution is de￿ned for z ￿ 1, whereas the distribution in (2) is de￿ned for z ￿ 0. But, as
discussed in footnote 9 of Eaton and Kortum (2001), this di⁄erence gets arbitrarily small as the T0s get large,
so one can safely ignore this di⁄erence.
19The ￿rm that captures the worldwide market for a good will make positive quasi-pro￿ts
by charging a mark-up that depends on the second-least unit cost. Eaton and Kortum (2001)
show that this mark-up is also distributed Pareto with parameter ￿, or m ￿ H(m).22 This is
the distribution for the mark-up charged by ￿rms from any country, and is constant through
time. Letting Yt denote worldwide income at time t, then (given the assumed preferences) this
is also the worldwide expenditure on every good. Hence, if a ￿rm charges a mark-up m, then




(1 ￿ 1=m)dH(m) = bYt
where b ￿ 1=(1+￿). Since country i captures the worldwide market for a share ￿it = Titcit
￿￿=￿t
of goods, its income is ￿itYt and its total pro￿ts are a share b of that.
Letting dit be the probability of a random idea from country i having a market at time
t, then the expected pro￿ts of a random idea from country i are bditYt. Thus, the expected






where ￿ is the discount rate in consumers￿intertemporal utility function, ut =
R 1
0 e￿￿(s￿t)Usds
and where Pt is the price index in (13).23
Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that dit = ￿it=Tit.24 To understand this result, recall that ￿it
is the share of worldwide spending devoted to purchases from country i and also the probability
that country i is the least-cost producer for a particular good. For an idea in country i to have
a market it must be the best idea in country i and it must beat the competition from all other
countries. The probability that a random idea is the best idea in country i is simply 1=Tit
whereas the probability that the idea beats the foreign competition is ￿it.
22To see this, recall from footnote 13 that the distribution of prices is Gt(p) = e￿￿tp
￿￿
. Thus, the probability
that an entrepreneur with an idea of quality q in country i can charge a mark-up at least as high as m is
1￿Gt(mwi=q). Hence, the probability that an idea of unknown quality from country i can charge a mark-up of
at least m is dit(m) =
R 1
1 [1 ￿ Gt(mwi=q)]dH(q) ￿ (mwi)￿￿=￿t, where the approximation is arbitrarily acurate
as the T0s get large (see Eaton and Kortum (2001), footnote 9). Conditional on selling at all, the distribution
of the mark-up is then Pr[M ￿ m j M ￿ 1] =
dit(1)￿dit(m)
dit(1) = H(m). This is independent of source and time,
hence this is also the distribution of the mark-up across all ￿rms in the world.
23The linearity assumption is made to simplify the analysis. The short-run and steady state results are clearly
independent of this assumption. As to the transition dynamics in subsection 3.3, the same results would obtain
under a more general speci￿cation of intertemporal preferences as long as countries 1 and 2 were able to access
international capital markets. See footnote 32.
24Formally, note from footnote 22 that the probability that an idea of unknown quality from country i is
competitive (i.e., m ￿ 1) is simply dit ￿ dit(1) = wit
￿￿=￿t = ￿it=Tit.
203.1 Short run analysis
At any point in time both Lit and Tit are ￿xed, just as in the static model. Thus, the only
di⁄erence between the full dynamic model and the static model of the previous section regarding
the short-run implications of o⁄shoring is the market structure: in the static model there is
perfect competition, whereas in the dynamic model technologies are owned by ￿rms that engage
in Bertrand competition. It turns out, however, that the existence of mark-ups and pro￿ts
under Bertrand competition has no e⁄ect on any of the comparative statics results derived
under perfect competition. This is because, as explained above, the pro￿t share is common
across countries.
To see this formally, note that trade balance now requires that exports of goods and o⁄-
shoring services plus domestic sales be equal to wages plus imports of o⁄shoring services plus
pro￿ts. Since the value of exports and domestic sales of goods is ￿itYt and pro￿ts are a share b
of this value, then we can equivalently state that trade balance requires (1￿b)￿itYt plus exports
of o⁄shoring services to equal wages paid to domestic and foreign workers (through o⁄shoring).
Thus, the trade balance conditions in the static model in equations (3), (6) and (7) are simply
adjusted by multiplying Yt by 1 ￿ b. All the results for wages in (4), (8) and (10) are not
a⁄ected, and the comparative statics results of the previous section remain valid.
3.2 Steady state analysis
In steady state Rit=LF
it will be constant and equal to ri, so the growth rate of the stock of ideas




The choice of country N￿ s labor as the numeraire implies that steady-state wages will be
constant, wit = wi, so from (13) we can see that Pt falls at a rate equal to ￿gL, so Ps =
Pte￿(gL=￿)(s￿t). In steady state ￿it is also constant (and simply denoted by ￿i). Moreover,







Consider country 1. Total expenditures are equal to wages paid, the cost of o⁄shoring, and
pro￿ts,
Y1t = w1L1t + w2￿L1t + bY1t (25)
21Using L1t = (1 ￿ r1)LF
1t, and solving for Y1t in (25), plugging the resulting expression for Y1t
into (24), using (23) and assuming ￿￿ > gL yields
V1 = w1
￿










Turning to country 2, we have
Y2t = w2L2t ￿ w2￿(1 ￿ r1)’L
F
2t + bY2t (27)
where ’ ￿ LF
1t=LF
2t. A similar procedure as above yields








For all the rest of countries (i 6= 1;2) the corresponding expected value of an idea can be
derived from the previous results by simply plugging in ￿ = 0, hence








In equilibrium the expected payo⁄ to research must be equal to the wage in every country.
This entails, ￿iVi = wi. For countries i 6= 1;2 this can be solved to yield
ri = r ￿ gL=￿￿ (30)
This implies that di⁄erences in ￿i do not a⁄ect the proportion of workers engaged in research.25
For countries 1 and 2 the equilibrium conditions are (after some simpli￿cation)
r1=r = 1 + ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1 (31)
and
r2=r = 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ r1)’ (32)
Given the wage ratio w2=w1, these two equations determine the research intensities in countries
1 and 2.








25Also note that r does not depend on country size or openness. This is because although larger markets lead
to higher pro￿ts for successful innovators, stronger competition reduces the probability of being successful, and
in this model these two e⁄ects exactly o⁄set each other (see Eaton and Kortum, 2001).
22Thus, from (4) and (30), we see that for i 6= 1;2 the steady-state equilibrium wage is
wi = (￿i=￿N)
b (34)
This is the same as in Eaton and Kortum (2001) and implies that wages di⁄er only because
of di⁄erences in research productivity ￿i. Notice that with no o⁄shoring (i.e., ￿ = 0) wages in
countries 1 and 2 are also given by (34). Thus, the condition that w1 > w2 in steady state with
no o⁄shoring is that ￿1 > ￿2, which I assume henceforth. (This is the long-run counterpart to
the condition ￿ > 1 in the previous section.)
I now turn to the determination of steady state wages in countries 1 and 2 when ￿ > 0. As
long as the resource constraint ￿(1￿r1)LF
1t ￿ LF
2t is satis￿ed, steady stage wages in countries 1
and 2 are determined by equations (8), (9), (10), and (11) together with Lit = (1 ￿ ri)LF
it and











which is the same as in the case of no o⁄shoring. The reason for this result is that the decline
in e L2 generated by increased o⁄shoring in the static model is now exactly compensated by a
decline in T2 caused by a decline in r2 (see below).
Turning to w1, recall from (10) that ((1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2) = (TNs=LNs)
￿b (T1s=e L1s)b. With
endogenous research the ratio T1s=e L1s now depends on research e⁄orts as well as the extent of









((1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2)
The equilibrium steady state wage in country 1 is then determined by





((1 ￿ ￿)w1 + ￿w2)
b (36)
26For this steady state analysis it is no longer necessary to worry about the possibility of factor price equal-
ization and the outsourcing constraint becoming non￿ binding. The reason is that - as will be shown below -
w2(￿) is constant whereas w1(￿) is increasing. Thus, since w1(0) > w2(0) by assumption, then w2(￿) > w1(￿)
for all ￿ > 0.




and captures the impact of o⁄shoring and research on country 10s terms of trade. It is easy to
show that given our assumption that ￿1 > ￿2 the level of w1 determined by equation (36) is
higher than w2.27 But this implies that o⁄shoring lowers the unit cost of the common input
(i.e., LHS is increasing in ￿). This represents the productivity e⁄ect discussed above. Turning
to the RHS, note that an increase in ￿ decreases this term, a re￿ ection of the negative terms of
trade e⁄ect discussed above. Which e⁄ect dominates? Since b < 1 then the productivity e⁄ect
always dominates, so w1 is increasing in ￿ (or ￿).28;29
I have so far ignored the resource constraint in country 2 that the amount of labor used for
exporting services to country 1 must be lower than its total labor force, namely ￿(1￿r1)LF
1t ￿
LF
2t. In fact, it can be shown from the results above that if r >
￿1
￿1+￿2=’ then the resource
constraint is satis￿ed for all ￿. Otherwise, there exists a level of ￿, ^ ￿, such that the resource
constraint is binding for ￿ > ^ ￿. In this case the equilibrium entails wage equalization, with all
workers in country 2 employed in o⁄shoring operations for country 2:
Again, the previous results relate to wages in countries 1 and 2 relative to some third country
N. But it can be shown that the price index P will decline with o⁄shoring, as the e¢ ciency gains
in the static model are only expanded in this dynamic model as o⁄shoring allows a reallocation
of labor towards the activity where they have comparative advantage (research in country 1
and production in country 2). The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 6 As long as the resource constraint in country 2 is non-binding, an increase in
o⁄shoring (i.e., an increase in ￿) increases the wage in country 1, whereas the wage in country
2 is not a⁄ected. The real wages wi=P increase in all countries.












27To see this, note that this is equivalent to saying that the LHS of (36) is lower than the RHS of this same
equation if w1 were equal to w2, or w
1￿b
2 < (￿1=w2￿N)
b, but this is equivalent to ￿2 < ￿1.






. The LHS is increasing in w1 while the RHS
is decreasing, and since w1 > w2 then an increase in ￿ implies a decline in the LHS, and hence an increase in
the equilibrium w1.
29A natural question is whether country 1 would also want to o⁄shore research to country 2. This would
require w1=￿1 > w2=￿2. But it can be shown (35) and (36) that this is never satis￿ed for any ￿ 2 [0;1].
24The term ￿(1￿r1)LF
1tw2=w1 is the number of workers indirectly hired by country 1 from country
2 through o⁄shoring, adjusting for the wage ratio. Thus, this equation says that the number
of people doing research in country 1 is a proportion r of the total labor force in country 1
including the workers indirectly working in country 1 through o⁄shoring (adjusting for wages).
Thus, r1 is necessarily higher with o⁄shoring than without o⁄shoring. Moreover, it can be
shown that ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1 is increasing in ￿, so it is also the case that as o⁄shoring increases
the research intensity r1 in country 1 increases.











Analogously to the result for country 1, this expression says that the number of people doing
research in country 2 is a proportion r of its total labor force excluding the workers producing
services for export through o⁄shoring operations. This implies that r2 < r as long as ￿ > 0.
More generally, it can be shown that r2 is decreasing in ￿. Formally,
Proposition 7 The research intensity r1 in country 1 increases while the research intensity r2
in country 2 decreases as ￿ increases.
3.3 Transition dynamics
Imagine an unexpected increase in fragmentation at time t0. We know from the previous section
that if the increase in ￿ is large enough, it would lead to a decline in the real wage in country
1 at time t0. As time goes by, however, workers in country 1 would switch from production
to research, increasing T1t=L1t and improving country 1￿ s terms of trade. In the new steady
state, the real wage in country 1 would be higher than it was before the increase in ￿. There
are then two opposite e⁄ects of a large (and unexpected) increase in fragmentation: a negative
short-run e⁄ect and a positive long-run e⁄ect. What is the net e⁄ect for utility at time t0?
To answer this question I now analyze the transition dynamics after a positive and unex-
pected shock to ￿ to show that if the speed with which people can switch between production
and research (i.e., ￿R) is su¢ ciently high then the net e⁄ect is positive. I restrict the analysis
to the limiting case in which the region composed of countries 1 and 2 is vanishingly small (as
in Section 2.6). This assumption implies that the rest of the world (i.e., countries i 6= 1;2) is
not a⁄ected by anything that happens in countries 1 and 2, and that Pt continues to fall at
25rate gL=￿ even after a shock to ￿. This implies that the expression for Vit in equation (24)
remains valid during the transition for countries 1 and 2. Di⁄erentiating this expression yields
the no-arbitrage condition
_ Vit=Vit = ￿(1 ￿ r) ￿ b(Yis=witTis)(wit=Vit)
Substituting for Yit from (25) and (27), and then for Lit=Tit from equations (8) ￿ (11) yields

























Letting xit ￿ Tit=LF
it and recalling that Lit = (1￿rit)LF
it, then from the short-run equilibrium
conditions we can get the following expressions for the unit cost c1t in country 1 and the wage
w2t in country 2,
c1t = (1 ￿ ￿)w1t + ￿w2t = ￿
￿
x1t







1 ￿ r2t ￿ ￿’(1 ￿ r1t)
￿b
(41)
Moreover, simple di⁄erentiation reveals that xit evolves according to
_ xit=xit = ￿i(1 ￿ rit)=xit ￿ gL (42)
Finally, the laws of motion of rit are governed by whether ￿iVit 7 wit. If ￿iVit > wit then




￿ gL = ￿P(1 ￿ rit)=rit





￿ gL = ￿￿R
Of course, if ￿iVit = wit then anything in between these values for _ rit=rit would be compatible





= ￿P(1 ￿ r1t)=r1t if ￿iVit > wit
2 [￿￿R;￿P(1 ￿ r1t)=r1t] if ￿iVit = wit
= ￿￿R if ￿iVit < wit
(43)
26An equilibrium adjustment path after an unexpected shock to ￿ in countries 1 and 2 is a
path for w1t;w2t;r1t;r2t;V1t;V2t;x1t;x2t that satis￿es (38), (39), (40), (41), (42) and (43) and
converges to the steady state in which wit = wi = ￿iVi, _ rit = _ xit = 0 and rit = ri, where wi and
ri are as determined in the previous section.
Inspection of equations (38)￿(41) reveals that for values of x1t and x2t that are not too far
below their steady state, we can always ￿nd values for r1t and r2t such that Vit and wit are at
their steady state, with ￿iVi = wi for i = 1;2.30 To understand this, note that ￿other things
equal ￿a low value for the technology parameter T1t implies a low x1t and low wage w1t. But
this would not occur if the low x1t is accompanied by a high research intensity r1t, because this
would nullify the negative e⁄ect of a low T1t on the ratio T1t=L1t, which determines wages in
the short run. More generally, if r1t and r2t were free values (and not predetermined as they
are in this model) then they could always accommodate (small) temporary deviations of x1t
and x2t from their steady state and thereby keep wages at their steady state values. In fact,
this is the key to understand the main result of this section, namely that if frictions in the
adjustment of people between research and production were very small, then an increase in ￿
would necessarily bene￿t country 1, because the (possible) short run loses identi￿ed in Sections
2 and 3.1 would be rapidly reversed thanks ￿rst to an decrease in L1t (increase in r1t) and then
to the increase in T1t brought about by the increased research e⁄orts. Of course, for country 2
this works in exactly the opposite direction: the short-run gains identi￿ed above vanish rapidly
as the research intensity there declines.
To simplify the analysis I make two assumptions on the parameters ￿P and ￿R which govern
the speed of adjustment: ￿rst, I assume that they are su¢ ciently large that rit can adjust in
the speed required for the RHS of (40) and (41) to remain constant given that xit is moving
according to (42). This implies that in the last stage of the adjustment process wages in
countries 1 and 2 will be at their steady states values, with r1t and r2t adjusting accordingly
(as explained in the previous paragraph). Second, I assume that exit from the research sector
is easier than entry into that sector. Formally, this entails assuming that ￿R is large relative to
￿P.
Under the previous assumptions, the equilibrium adjustment after an unexpected increase
in ￿ has three stages. In the ￿rst stage ￿1V1t > w1t and ￿2V2t < w2t, so there is maximal entry
30Simple algebra reveals that plugging ￿iVi = wi and the steady state levels of w1 and w2 calculated in the
previous section into equations (38) and (39) yields _ Vit = 0.
27into research in country 1 and maximal exit from research in country 2. This stage ends when
w2t reaches w2.31 In the second stage, ￿1V1t > w1t and ￿2V2t = w2t = w2, so maximal entry into
research continues in country 1 while the constraint on exit from research in country 2 is no
longer binding. This stage ends when w1t reaches w1. The third stage is as explained above: it
entails ￿iVit = wit = wi for i = 1;2, so that wages in countries 1 and 2 are at their steady state
values, and r1t and r2t adjust in response to the continued movement of x1t and x2t towards
their steady state values.
In these conditions, it is clear that if ￿P and ￿R are very high, then the ￿rst two stages of
the adjustment process will be very short, and the adjustment will entail wages being at their
new steady state values most of the time. Since an increase in ￿ brings about an increase in
the steady state wage of country 1, then this country must bene￿t from such a shock even if it
experiences some losses in the short run. Country 2 also experiences a positive welfare e⁄ect,
because wages are momentarily higher there after the shock, although they rapidly converge to
the same level as before the shock.32
The analysis so far has focused on the e⁄ects of an unexpected shock in fragmentation. If
the shock is anticipated, then the previous analysis suggests that the e⁄ects should be even
more positive for country 1, as it can start reallocating its labor from production to research
even before the shock and in that way lessen the terms of trade deterioration. The opposite
occurs for country 2, where the temporary increase in its terms of trade may vanish if the
shock is anticipated. Although there are no clear statistics that one could use to measure
fragmentation, it is reasonable to assume that it is a gradual and somewhat anticipated process
rather than a sudden shock. In this case, the analysis suggests that as long as reallocation
between production and research is not too sluggish, the net e⁄ect should be positive for rich
countries and small (but positive) for poor countries.
31This necessarily happens before c1t reaches its steady state thanks to the assumption that ￿R is large relative
to ￿P.
32These results are valid under the assumption that intertemporal preferences are linear. When the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is low and there are no international capital ￿ ows, my conjecture is that even
with pefect mobility of people between research and the production sector, a large unexepected increase in
fragmentation would decrease utility, as people would not be willing to decrease their consumption to allow for
a large increase in research e⁄orts to accelerate the transition.
284 O⁄shoring and immigration
This kind of analysis can also be used to shed light on the e⁄ects of migration, which in turn may
allow us to gain some intuition about the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring just described.33 Consider again
countries 1 and 2, with w1 > w2 thanks to ￿ > 1 and no o⁄shoring, and imagine that a restricted
share ￿ of people from country 2 can costlessly migrate to country 1. As ￿ increases, there is
a short-run (with constant T 0s) decline in ￿, which leads to a decline in w1 and an increase in
w2. This captures the idea put forth by Davis and Weinstein (2002) that immigration leads to
losses to the host country due to a deterioration of its terms of trade.
But, again, this is only in the short run: in the Eaton and Kortum (2001) model with
endogenous technology levels, immigration leads to an expansion of research in country 1 and
a contraction of research in country 2 in such a way that (in steady state) T1=L1 and T2=L2
remain constant because Ti=Li = ￿ir=(1￿r)gL doesn￿ t depend on LF
i . Wages w1 and w2 are not
a⁄ected, and the only e⁄ect is a decline in prices thanks to the increased e¢ ciency generated
by migration towards countries with higher research productivities (i.e., the long-run world
e¢ ciency e⁄ect). Thus, in the long run all countries gain equally, and the main bene￿ciaries of
migration are the migrants themselves, who experience an increase in wages from w2 to w1.34
Let￿ s compare these results of migration with those of o⁄shoring in the long run. As shown
in the subsection 3.3, in steady state o⁄shoring does not a⁄ect wages in country 2, but wages
in country 1 experience an increase. Thus, focusing on the long run implications, o⁄shoring is
better for country 1 than immigration. The reason for this is that with migration the receiving
country ends up paying the high country 1 wage to immigrants, whereas with o⁄shoring country
1 ￿rms pay the low country 2 wage to workers who remain in country 2. Thus, whereas
with migration the main bene￿ciaries are the migrants, with o⁄shoring the main bene￿ciaries
are workers in country 1, whose wage can now increase thanks to the e¢ ciency gains from
o⁄shoring.35
33Baldwin and Robert-Nicaud (2007) relate the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring to what they call "shadow migration."
34The result that the e⁄ect of immigration on wages is more bene￿cial in the long run than in the short run
can also be obtained in the Hecksher-Ohlin model as well as in models that allow for capital accumulation (see
Klein and Ventura, 2007, and Ottaviano and Peri, 2006).
35The point that o⁄shoring leads to larger gains than migration because of the di⁄erence in the wage paid to
the extra labor made available is discussed in Jones (2005).
295 Extensions
I have assumed thus far that increasing o⁄shoring is made possible by the raising capability
to fragment the production process and thereby arrange to have more intermediate services
performed abroad. Alternatively, as in Kohler (2004) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006),
the expansion of o⁄shoring could be seen as the consequence of a decline in the cost of importing
these services. In fact, the model presented above could be interpreted in this light by assuming
that a share ￿ of services can be o⁄shored at no cost, whereas the rest entail an in￿nite cost
of o⁄shoring. A question is whether the results derived under this set-up generalize to other
ways of modeling such costs. In this section I present an extension of the model to explore this
question, and then I extend the analysis to o⁄shoring among three countries.
I assume that importing labor service k entails an iceberg cost ￿(k) ￿ 1. The cost of labor
service k o⁄shored to country 2 is then ￿(k)w2. Country 1 will procure service k from country
2 if ￿(k)w2 < w1 and may do so also if ￿(k)w2 = w1. Following the stochastic approach of
Eaton and Kortum (2002), I assume that ￿(k) (for k 2 [0;1]) is independently drawn from
an exponential distribution with parameter ￿ and a mass point at 1. Formally, for any k and
￿0 ￿ 1 we have Pr(￿ ￿ ￿0) = F(￿0;￿) ￿ 1 ￿ exp(￿￿￿0), where ￿ > 0. Note that a higher ￿
implies lower average o⁄shoring costs and that as ￿ ! 0 then o⁄shoring necessarily goes to
zero. This stochastic approach will be useful below when I extend the analysis to more than
two countries.
The goal is to understand the short-run and long-run e⁄ects of an increase in ￿. Consider
￿rst the short run. Analogously to the results of Section 2, when ￿ is su¢ ciently high there
is full o⁄shoring, with wages in both country 1 and 2 equal to wm = ￿(Tm=Lm)b (recall that
Tm = T1 + T2 and Lm = L1 + L2). The critical value for ￿, ￿m, is implicitly de￿ned by
F(1;￿m) = ￿ ￿, where ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=(1+ ￿ ￿) (￿ ￿ was de￿ned in Section 2). In other words, ￿ needs to be
high enough that the share of services for which there are no transportation costs (￿(k) = 1)
is at least as high as the share of services that must be o⁄shored for there to be full o⁄shoring
(￿ ￿). It is clear that the wage under full o⁄shoring is higher than the wage that would prevail
under no o⁄shoring in country 2, but lower than the corresponding wage in country 1. Formally,
letting wi(0) ￿ lim￿!0 wi(￿), we have w1(0) > wm > w2(0).
If ￿ < ￿m, the equilibrium entails w1 > w2. I now characterize this equilibrium. Let
C1(k) ￿ minfw1;￿(k)w2g represent the cost of service k for country 1. (Since all services are
30homogenous, from now on I supress the index k unless necessary to avoid confusion.) The
cost C1 can never be lower than w2 and is lower than c1 for c1 2 [w2;w1[ if ￿w2 < c1. This
implies that for c1 2 [w2;w1[, Pr(C1 ￿ c1) = Pr(￿w2 ￿ c1) = F(c1=w2;￿) = F(c1;￿=w2), so the
distribution of the variable C1 is given by




0 if c1 < w2
F(c1;￿=w2) if c1 2 [w2;w1[
1 if c1 ￿ w1
The unit cost of the common input in country 1 is simply the expectation of C1 for this
distribution. I will use c1(w) (with w ￿ (w 1;w2)) to denote this unit cost as a function of
wages. This is simply
c1(w) = w2F(1;￿) +
Z w1
w2
xdF(x;￿=w2)dx + w1(1 ￿ F(w1;￿=w2))
On the other hand, the unit cost of the common input in country 2 is simply w2. Also, note
that if w1 > w2 then the share of services o⁄shored to country 2 is s(w) = F(w1;￿=w2).
Thus, following the same analysis as in Section 2, the equilibrium conditions for ￿ < ￿m are
c1(w) = ￿(T1=e L1)b and w2 = ￿(T2=e L2)b (as in equations (10) and (8)) but with
e L1 = L1=(1 ￿ s(w))
and
e L2 = L2 ￿ ￿(w)s(w)L1=(1 ￿ s(w))







Note that in these de￿nitions of e L1 and e L2, the term s(w) substitutes for ￿ in equations (11)
and (9).
Several of the results in Section 2 remain essentially unchanged in this case. First, there is
full o⁄shoring as long as ￿ ￿ ￿m. Second, w2(0) < wm < w1(0), so that the rich (poor) country
attains a lower (higher) relative wage under full o⁄shoring than with no fragmentation. This
result clearly also extends to real wages, so we can say that the rich (poor) country is worse
(better) o⁄under full o⁄shoring than with no fragmentation. Third, as shown in the Appendix,
the sign of the partial derivative of w1 with respect to ￿ converges to (w1(0)=w2(0))
2 (1￿2b)￿1
31as ￿ ! 0. This implies that, since b < 1=2 (because ￿ > 1), the curve w1(￿) will be upward
sloping for low ￿ if w1(0)=w2(0) = ￿b is su¢ ciently high.
Turning to the long run equilibrium, the result that w2 is ￿xed at (￿2=￿N)
b remains valid:
o⁄shoring costs a⁄ect the quantity of labor used in country 2 to export services to country 1,
but the steady state wage in country 2 is una⁄ected by this. As for country 1, the wage is







Simple derivation (see Appendix) reveals that the curve c1(w) decreases with ￿, hence the
steady state w1 is increasing with ￿. This implies that, similar to the results in Section 3, in
the long run the rich country gains from a decline in the cost of o⁄shoring whereas the poor
country gains but just from the world e¢ ciency e⁄ect.
Finally, I extend the model to allow for o⁄shoring among countries 1, 2, and 3, where
country 1 is the rich country, and country 2 is the poor country. Formally, I assume that
T1=L1 > T3=L3 > T2=L2 and ￿1 > ￿3 > ￿2. The (iceberg) costs of o⁄shoring service k
to country i = 1;2;3 are ￿i(k), which are independently drawn from the same distribution,
assumed to be exponential with a mass point at 1 and parameter ￿. The Appendix contains
the full characterization of equilibrium in the short run and the long run for this case. Here I
present a short discussion and the results of a numerical simulation.
Just as in the two country case, there is full o⁄shoring among the three countries if ￿ is
higher than some critical level. Under full o⁄shoring w1(0) > wm > w2(0).36 The middle-income
country is better o⁄ under full o⁄shoring than with no o⁄shoring if Tm=Lm > T3=L3. To gain
some additional understanding about the behaviour of wages in relation to ￿, I simulated the
equilibrium for ￿ = 8 (the central value of ￿ in Eaton and Kortum, 2002) with L1 = L2 = L3
and T1 = 1, T2 = 0:04, and T = 0:2. Figure 1 shows the resulting wages as ￿ goes from 0 to the
value of ￿ under which there is full o⁄shoring. As in Section 2, w2 is always increasing while w1
behaves like an inverted U. (This last result no longer holds when T1=L1 is close to T2=L2, in
which case w1 is decreasing in ￿.) The wages of countries 2 and 3 converge for a level of ￿ near
0:34. For ￿ ￿ 0:34, w3 behaves like an inverted U, but it is increasing thereafter. This behavior
of w3 with respect to ￿ is not a general result: under alternative parameters, w3(￿) can behave
more like w1(￿) (if T3=L3 is close to T1=L1) or like w2(￿) (if T3=L3 is close to T2=L2).
36As above, we have wm = ￿(Tm=Lm)b, but now Tm = T1 + T2 + T3 and Lm = L1 + L2 + L3.
32Figure 1: This simulation uses ￿ = 1, ￿ = 8, L1 = L2 = L3 = 1 and T1 = 1, T2 = 0:04, and
T3 = 0:2.
Turning to the long run analysis, it is easy to show that the steady state wage in country 2
is constant, whereas the steady state wage in country 3 is increasing in ￿. The reasoning here
is exactly the same as for the result that the steady state wage in country 1 is increasing in ￿
in the two-country case. As to the wage in country 1, there are two opposite e⁄ects from the
increase in ￿: on the one hand, this increases w3, which has a negative e⁄ect on country 1, but
on the other hand, there is a direct and positive e⁄ect on w1. In the numerical simulation for
￿1=￿N = 1, ￿2=￿N = 0:04, and ￿3=￿N = 0:2, illustrated in Figure 2, w1 is increasing in ￿. This
result holds also in all numerical simulations that I have performed.
33Figure 2: This simulation uses ￿ = 8, ￿1=￿N = 1, ￿2=￿N = 0:04, and ￿3=￿N = 0:2.
6 Conclusion
Over the last years there has been much discussion about the possible e⁄ects of increased o⁄-
shoring on rich countries. Those with a favorable view have focused on the productivity gains
associated with increasing trade in services, while the critics have emphasized the negative
implications for rich-country wages of what some have called "the death of distance" (Cairn-
cross, 1997). In this paper I have presented a model that captures both of these e⁄ects. A
main result is that a large and unexpected increase in fragmentation necessarily harms the rich
country and bene￿ts the poor country in the short run. But this also triggers a reallocation
of resources towards research in the rich country and towards production in the poor country.
Such reallocations weaken the terms of trade e⁄ects of o⁄shoring and imply that the long run
e⁄ect of increased fragmentation is always positive for the rich country. In contrast, the poor
country derives no direct gains from o⁄shoring and bene￿ts only from the improvement in world
34e¢ ciency that arises from increased trade, just as third countries that do not participate at all
in o⁄shoring.
The implications of o⁄shoring for rich countries turn out to be closely related to those of
immigration. In both cases there is a short-run decline in the terms of trade and reallocation
of resources from production to research that weakens this e⁄ect in the long run. But there is
a key di⁄erence: whereas workers that export services through o⁄shoring are paid the wages
prevailing in poor countries, migrants earn rich-country wages. As a result, rich countries stand
to gain more from increased fragmentation and o⁄shoring than from immigration.
Coming back to the e⁄ects of o⁄shoring, the presence of opposite short and long run e⁄ects
implies that the net e⁄ect of increased fragmentation for intertemporal utility in the rich country
could be positive or negative. This depends on the speed with which resources can be reallocated
across production and research: if this is su¢ ciently fast, then the long run e⁄ects dominate and
the rich country gains from o⁄shoring. More generally, if there is a gradual process of increasing
fragmentation, the rich country gains as long as the intersectoral reallocation of resources is
not too sluggish relative to the pace at which fragmentation is increasing.
Blinder (2007) has expressed concerns that the future increase of o⁄shoring in services will
generate large costs for the U.S. during a prolonged transition. One way to interpret this concern
in light of the model presented here is that the process of deepening fragmentation will be too
fast in relation to the country￿ s ability to reallocate resources from production to research. The
model suggests one way to prevent these transitory costs: by imposing an optimal tari⁄ or
export tax the rich country would eliminate the possibility that increased fragmentation and
o⁄shoring harms the rich country even in the short run. Of course, such a policy presents many
potential dangers, so a better (but more di¢ cult) approach would be the implementation of
education and other policies to facilitate the reallocation of people from production to research,
or from simple tradable tasks to the development of "new processes, new products, and entirely
new industries" (Blinder, 2007, p. 28).
A ￿nal issue worth discussing concerns the result that fragmentation does not directly bene￿t
the poor countries engaged in o⁄shoring in the long run. This seems inconsistent with the
impression of large gains from increasing service exports by some poor countries, particularly
India. It could be argued that, as in the model, these are merely short run gains that will
dissipate in the long run, but this seems unlikely. One explanation for long run gains is the
existence of knowledge spillovers triggered by o⁄shoring. The modeling of such spillovers and the
35estimation of their quantitative importance is certainly an important issue for future research.37
Alternatively, India￿ s current prosperity could be seen as resulting from its innovative provision
of services that permit ￿rms in rich countries to fragment and o⁄shore part of their production
process. According to this view, the increase in ￿ that causes increased o⁄horing in the model
above is actually the result of innovations by Indian ￿rms. Such ￿rms would then capture some
of the productivity gains that in this paper have been assumed to go entirely to rich countries.
This too seems a worthwile topic for further exploration.
37See Tre￿ er (2005) for a broad discussion of this issue in the context of service o⁄shoring.
36Appendix
This Appendix presents the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Proof of Proposition 1






























, it is enough to prove the inequality for ￿￿m = 0: Thus, using wi =
￿ (Ti=Li)

























































































Proof of Proposition 2
We have












































is increasing in ￿: To
determine the sign of w0
1(￿) on [0; ￿ ￿) we should then compare w0
1(0) and w0
1(￿ ￿) with zero.
Focusing ￿rst on w0



































b (1 ￿ b) ￿ 1
￿
> 0 () ￿ > (1 ￿ b)
￿1=b
Thus, if ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ b)
￿1=b, then w1(￿) is always decreasing on [0; ￿ ￿): If ￿ > (1 ￿ b)
￿1=b, then
w1(￿) is shaped like an inverted U on [0; ￿ ￿): Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3

























































(1 + ￿)￿b ￿ T b











> 0, while simple algebra reveals that f(￿ ￿) = 0. Since f0(￿) < 0, then








￿ > 0, or
￿0
￿ > 0: But given P = ￿￿￿1=￿ then this implies that P 0
￿ < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4









P : But simple di⁄erentiation
































where x ￿ ￿b, f(￿) = 1￿￿L1=L2. Let xF(￿) and xG(￿) be de￿ned implicitly by F(x;￿) = 0 and
G(x;￿) = 0, respectively. The following lemma, whose proof is simple and therefore omitted,
summarizes a number of properties of these functions:

















Also, xF(￿) < xG(￿), x0
F(￿) > 0, x0
G(￿) > 0.
Let xM(￿) be de￿ned implicitly by G(x;￿) = F(x;￿). Such a solution necessarily exists
since xF(￿) < xG(￿) and F(x;￿) is decreasing in x and G(x;￿) is increasing in x. Also, it is
clear that 1 < xF(￿) < xM(￿) < xG(￿). Since x > xM(￿) implies G > F then it also implies
that w1=P is increasing. Similarly, x < xM(￿) implies that w1=P is decreasing. The following
lemma (whose is proof is long and therefore provided in a separate Appendix downloadable
from http://www.econ.psu.edu/~aur10/research.htm) is critical:
Lemma 3 xM(￿) is increasing
Let ^ ￿ be equal to xM(0)1=b: If ￿ ￿ ^ ￿; then x = ￿b ￿ xM(0) ￿ xM(￿) for any ￿: This implies
that F(x) > G(x) (except the case when x = ^ ￿
b and ￿ = 0), so w1=P is decreasing. This
establishes the ￿rst part of the proposition. To establish the second part, we need the following
lemma:
Lemma 4 For any ￿ > ^ ￿ = (xM(0))
1=b we have x = ￿b < xM(￿ ￿(￿)).
39Proof. The proof relies on showing that F(￿b; ￿ ￿(￿)) = 0, which implies that ￿b = xF(￿ ￿(￿)). If
this is true then xM(￿ ￿(￿)) > ￿b, because since xF(￿) < xM(￿) for all ￿ then ￿b = xF(￿ ￿(￿)) <
xM(￿ ￿(￿)), which establishes the result. But from the de￿nition of ￿ ￿ we see that
￿ =
1 + ￿ ￿
f(￿ ￿)
and plugging this into F(￿b; ￿ ￿) shows that F(￿b; ￿ ￿(￿)) = 0.
This lemma implies that if ￿ > ^ ￿ then w1=P is increasing for ￿ = 0 and decreasing just
before ￿ = ￿ ￿(￿), with a unique point ￿ for which xM(￿) = x at which G = F and hence
(w1=P)
0
￿ = 0. This implies that the curve w1=P as a function of ￿ in the interval ￿ 2 [0; ￿ ￿[ is
shaped like an inverted U.
Proof of Proposition 6
The only thing left to show is that steady state P is decreasing in ￿. It is su¢ cient to show






































But plugging in from the equations (31) and (32) we get that
’r1w1 + w2r2 = ’w1 + w2
which is increasing in ￿. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
I ￿rst show that x = ￿w2=w1 is increasing in ￿. From (36) we get (￿1=￿N)
b = z (1 + x)
1￿b =
zb(z + w2￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿b)1￿b, where z ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)1￿bw1. Since ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿b is increasing in ￿ then z
must be decreasing in ￿. In turn, this implies that x must be increasing in ￿.
Now, recall that r1 is determined as the solution of r1 = r(1 + ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1). Both the
LHS and the RHS are linear functions in r1, with the LHS increasing and the RHS decreasing.
40An increase in ￿ moves the RHS schedule upward because ￿w2=w1 increases with ￿, while the
LHS schedule remains the same. This implies that r1 increases.
In the text, before stating proposition 7 I also stated that ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1 is increas-
ing in ￿. To see this, note that since r1 is increasing in alpha, then the RHS of r1 =
r(1 + ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1) must be increasing in ￿, so ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1 is increasing in ￿.
Finally, to prove that r2 is decreasing in ￿, from (32) I need to show that ￿(1 ￿ r1) is
increasing in ￿. But we know that ￿(1 ￿ r1)w2=w1 is increasing in ￿ while w2 is constant and
w1 is increasing. This implies that ￿(1 ￿ r1) must be increasing in ￿. Q.E.D.
Equilibrium with o⁄shoring costs: 2 countries
Let
C(w1;w2;￿) ￿ w2F(1;￿) +
Z w1
w2
xdF(x;￿=w2)dx + w1(1 ￿ F(w1;￿=w2))
Integration and simpli￿cation yields
C(w1;w2;￿) = w2 ￿ (w2=￿)exp(￿￿w1=w2) + (w2=￿)exp(￿￿)
Letting s(w1;w2;￿) ￿ F(w1=w2;￿) and ￿(w1;w2;￿) = ￿(w1;w2;￿)s(w1;w2;￿), or
￿(w1;w2;￿) ￿ 1 ￿ (1=￿)exp(￿￿w1=w2) ￿ w1=w2 exp(￿￿w1=w2) + (1=￿)exp(￿￿)











L2 ￿ ￿(w1;w2;￿)L1=(1 ￿ s(w1;w2;￿))
￿b
(45)







































































w2 exp(￿￿w1=w2) ￿ w2 exp(￿￿) + w1￿exp(￿￿w1=w2) ￿ w2￿exp(￿￿)
￿
2
Since both the numerator and denominators converge to 0 as ￿ ! 0 then we can use L￿ Hopital￿ s







































2 (1 ￿ 2b) ￿ 1
￿
This implies that lim￿!0 dw1=d￿ > 0 if and only if (w1=w2)
2 > 1=(1 ￿ 2b).
To show that @C=@￿ < 0, note that this is equivalent to
(1 + w1￿=w2)exp(￿￿w1=w2) < (1 + ￿)exp(￿￿)
This inequality holds since the function f(x) ￿ (1 + x)exp(￿x) is clearly decreasing.
Equilibrium with o⁄shoring costs: 3 countries
I ￿rst characterize an equilibrium in which w1 > w3 > w2. In this case the distribution of
c1 is




0 if c1 < w2
F(c1;￿=w2) if c1 2 [w2;w3[
F(c1;’) if c1 2 [w3;w1[
1 if c1 ￿ w1
42where ’ ￿ ￿=w2 + ￿=w3, and unit cost of the common input in country 1 is




+w3 (F(w3;’) ￿ F(w3;￿=w2)) +
Z w1
w3
dF(x;’) + w1(1 ￿ F(w1;’))






where s = 1 ￿ exp(￿’w1) is the total share of services o⁄shored. This share is distributed
between countries 2 and 3 as follows:











Note that s = s12 + s13.
On the other hand, we have that




0 if c3 < w2
F(c3;￿=w2) if c3 2 [w2;w3[
1 if c3 ￿ w3
and
c3(w1;w2;w3) ￿ w2F(1;￿) +
Z w3
w2
xdF(x;￿2=w2) + w3(1 ￿ F(w3;￿2=w2)
and
s32(w2;w3) = F(w3;￿2=w2)




for i = 2;3,
with c2(w1;w2;w3) = w2. To derive e L3, note that country 1 uses L1=(1￿s) of every service, and
if the o⁄shoring cost of a service in country 3 is ￿3 then it takes ￿3L1=(1 ￿ s) units of labor to
produce L1=(1 ￿ s) units of a service delivered in country 1. The expectation of ￿3 for services
o⁄shored by country 1 to country 3 is












L1 units of labor are left in country 3 for ￿nal good production.

























On the other hand, country 2 export services to countries 1 and 3. The labor it takes to export





L1, where ￿12 is the expectation of ￿2 for services o⁄shored by
country 1 to country 2, and is given by























units of labor to do so, with ￿32 representing the expectation of ￿2 for
services o⁄shored by country 3 to country 2, given by




Thus, we ￿nd that

















If the previous system yields wages that do not respect w1 > w3 > w2 then it is not an
equilibrium. Other possible equilibrium con￿gurations have w1 > w2 = w3, w1 = w3 > w2, and
































with s = s12 + s13. For every s32 these equations determine s12 and s13, so these variables
are not uniquely pinned down in equilibrium: there is no uniqueness because of the absence of
o⁄shoring costs for the services that are traded, but all equilibria entail the same wages.38 If one
can ￿nd a solution with s < F(1;2￿) and s12;s13;s32 < F(1;￿), then this solution corresponds
38Although there are 3 equations for 3 unknowns (s12, s13 and s32), these equations are linearly dependent,
so they determine only two unknowns.
44to an equilibrium with full o⁄shoring. Since F(1;2￿) and F(1;￿) both converge to 1 as ￿ ! 1
then necessarily there is some critical value of ￿ such that for higher values of ￿ the equilibrium
entails full o⁄shoring.
I now establish the equilibrium conditions when wages entail w1 > w2 = w3 and w1 = w3 >
w2. If w1 > w2 = w3 then countries 2 and 3 are integrated and their wage should be the same
as the one we would would get in a two country system, with
w2 = w3 = w23 = ￿
 
T2 + T3







but with countries 2 and 3 drawing their o⁄shoring cost from F(￿;2￿), and with s = F(w1=w23;2￿)
and













































with the restriction that ￿32 = s32 ￿ F(1;￿) and




The ￿rst term on the RHS is the measure of services for which ￿2 or ￿3 are equal to 1, while
the second term is the o⁄shoring cost for services with ￿i 2]1;w1=w3].
Now consider the case with w1 = w3 > w2. This entails
w1 = w3 = w13 = ￿
￿














45where s = F(w13=w2;￿) and




For this to be an equilibrium, we need that ￿13 = s13 ￿ F(1;￿), have s32 = s12 = F(w13=w2;￿)
and




and the equations of the full system.





for i = 1;2;3, with
c2(w1;w2;w3) = w2. This equation for i = 2 can be solved directly to yield w2 = (￿2=￿N)b,
as in (35). Plugging this into the equation for i = 3 yields an equation that can be solved for
the equilibrium wage in country 3, w3. We can easily check that w3 is increasing in ￿. Finally,
plugging the solution w3(￿) into the equation for i = 1 yields the equilibrium w1(￿).
46References
Alvarez, F. and R. Lucas (2005), "General Equilibrium Analysis of the Eaton-Kortum Model
of International Trade," NBER Working Paper No. 11764.
Baily, Martin N. and Robert Z. Lawrence, 2004, "What Happened to the Great US Job Ma-
chine? The Role of Trade and Electronic O⁄shoring," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Ed. William C. Brainard and George L. Perry. Brookings Institution.
Baldwin, Richard, 2006, "Globalisation: The Great Unbundling(s)," Working Paper, Eco-
nomic Council of Finland.
Baldwin, Richard and Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2007, "O⁄shoring: General Equilibrium
E⁄ects on Wages, Production and Trade," NBER Working Paper No. 12991.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1958, "Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note," The Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. (June), pp. 201-205.
Bhagwati, J., A. Panagariya and T. N. Srinivasan, 2004, ￿The Muddles Over O⁄shoring,￿
Journal of Economic Perspectives, V. 18, No. 4, Fall, pp. 93-114.
Blinder, Alan S., 2006, "O⁄shoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?" Foreign A⁄airs, New
York: Mar/Apr, Vol.85, Iss. 2, pp. 113-28.
Blinder, Alan S., 2007, "O⁄shoring: Big Deal, or Business as Usual?," mimeo, Princeton
University.
Cairncross, Frances, 1997, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution
Will Change Our Lives, Harvard Business School Press.
Davis, D. R. and D. E. Weinstein, 2002, "Technological Superiority and the Losses from
Migration," NBER Working Paper No. 8971.
Deardor⁄, Alan V., 2001, "Fragmentation in Simple Trade Models," North American Jour-
nal of Economics and Finance, 12, pp. 121-137.
Deardor⁄, Alan V., 2004, "A Trade Theorist￿ s Take on Skilled-Labor o⁄shoring," RSIE
Discussion Papers No. 519, University of Michigan.
Deardor⁄, Alan V., 2005, "Gains from Trade and Fragmentation," RSIE Discussion Papers
No. 543, University of Michigan.
Eaton, Jonathan and Sam Kortum, 2001, "Technology, trade and growth: A uni￿ed frame-
work," European Economic Review 45, pp. 742-755.
Eaton, Jonathan and Sam Kortum, 2002, "Technology, geography, and trade," Econometrica
4770, 1741-1780.
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1996, "Foreign Investment, Outsourcing and
Relative Wages," in Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman and Douglas A. Irwin, eds., The
Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, MIT Press, pp.
89-127.
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson, 1999, "The Impact of Outsourcing and High-
Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the U.S., 1979-1990." Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 114, pp. 907-40.
Friedman, Thomas, 2005, The Earth is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-￿rst Century,
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.
Grossman, Gene and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a, "The Rise of O⁄shoring: It￿ s Not
Wine for Cloth Anymore," manuscript, Princeton University
Grossman, Gene and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, 2006b, "Trade in Tasks: A Simple Theory
of O⁄shoring," manuscript, Princeton University.
Hira, Ron and Anil Hira, 200, Outsourcing America: What￿ s Behind Our National Crisis
And How We Can Reclaim American Jobs, AMACOM, New York.
Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski, 1990, ￿The Role of Services in Production and
International Trade: a Theoretical Framework,￿ in Ronald W. Jones and Anne O. Krueger
(eds.), The Political Economy of International Trade, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 31￿ 48.
Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski, 2001, ￿Globalization and the Consequences
of International Fragmentation,￿in R. Dornbusch, ed., Money, Capital Mobility and Trade:
Essays in Honor of Robert A. Mundell, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Klein, Paul and Gustavo Ventura, 2007, "TFP Di⁄erences and the Aggregate E⁄ects of
Labor Mobility in the Long Run," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 (Con-
tributions), Article 10.
Kohler, Willhelm, 2004, "International Outsourcing and Factor Prices with Multistage Pro-
duction" Economic Journal, 114 (March), pp. 166-185.
Leamer, Edward E., 2006, "A Flat World, A Level Playing Field, a Small World After All,
or None of the Above? - A Review of Thomas L. Friedman￿ s The World is Flat," manuscript,
UCLA.
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Phillip Swagel, 2006, "The Politics and Economics of O⁄shore
o⁄shoring," NBER Working Paper No. 12398.
48Markusen, James, 2005, "Modeling the O⁄shoring of White-Collar Services: From Com-
parative Advantage to the New Theories of Trade and FDI,￿in Brookings Trade Forum on
￿O⁄shoring White-Collar Work.￿
Mitra, Devashish and Priya Ranjan, 2007, "O⁄shoring and Unemployment," manuscript,
Syracuse University.
Ottaviano, I. P. and G. Peri, 2006, "Rethinking the E⁄ects of Immigration on Wages,"
NBER Working Paper No. 12497.
Roberts, Craig John, 2004, "The Harsh Truth About Outsourcing: The Future Of Work,"
Business Week, March 22.
Samuelson, Paul, 2004, "Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Con￿rm Arguments of Main-
stream Economists Supporting Globalization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer,
18:3, pp. 135￿ 46.
Tre￿ er, Daniel, 2006, "Service O⁄shoring: Threats and Opportunities," in Brookings Trade
Forum 2005: O⁄shoring White-Collar Work, edited by Susan M. Collins and Lael Brainard.
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 35-60.
Yi, Kei-Mu, 2003, "Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade," Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 111(1), pp. 52-102.
49